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Report Summary
The cooperative agreement partly supported research
leading to the open-literature publication cited below.
Additional efforts under the agreement included research
into fault modelling of semiconductor devices. Results of
this research are presented in this report which is
summarized in the following paragraphs.
As a result of the cited research, it appears that
semiconductor failure mechanism data is abundant but of
little use in developing pin-level device models. Failure
mode data on the other hand does exist but is too sparse to
be of any (statistical) use in developing fault models. What
is significant in the failure mode data is that, unlike
classical logic, MSI and LSI devices do exhibit more than
"stuck-at" and open/short failure modes. Specifically they
are dominated by parametric failures and functional anomalies
that can include intermittent faults and multiple-pin
failures.
The report discusses methods of developing composite
pinlevel models based on extrapolation of semiconductor
device failure mechanisms, failure modes, results of
(temperature) stress testing and functional modelling.
Limitations of this model particularly with regard to
determination of fault detection coverage and latency time
measurement are discussed.
Indicated research directions are presented.
Reference
Dunn, W.R., "Software Reliability: Measures and Effects in
Flight Critical Digital Avionics Systems", 7th Digital
Avionics Systems Conference, Fort Worth, Texas, October 13-
16, 1986.
Notation
DTL = Diode-Transistor Logic
FMEA = Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
FMET = Failure Modes & Effects Tests
LSTTL = Low Power Schottky Transistor-Transistor Logic
RAC
SSI
VLSI
= Reliability Analysis Center
= Small Scale Integration
= Very Large Scale Integration
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INVESTIGATION OF ADVANCED FAULT INSERTION AND SIMULATOR
METHODS
1.0 Introduction
In the design and development of a flight-critical
digital system, it is necessary to prove that the system can
tolerate single- and multiple-component faults. Two widely-
used methods supporting such proof are Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Modes and Effects Testing
(FMET) . FMEA is usually performed very early in the design
process either by hand or, in more complex systems, through
fault simulation. FMET is performed toward the end of
development and prior to initial flight test. In Failure
Modes and Effects Testing, actual or simulated faults are
inserted in the actual digital system (generally configured
in ground-based, "iron bird" environment) in order to
validate system fault tolerance. Both FMEA and FMET
activities require knowledge of probable component failure
modes.
This report addresses the subject of digital integrated
circuit semiconductor failure modes. The study leading to
the report was motivated by the suspicion that the permanent,
"stuck- at" type failure modes characteristic of relay,
transistor and small-scale integrated circuit logic might not
fully embrace possible failure modes in many of the Medium
Scale Integration (MSI) and Very Large Scale Integration
(VLSI) components employed in modern, flight-critical digital
system designs. The study was therefore undertaken with the
(admittedly ambitious) objective of developing an approach
for deriving practical fault models for MSI digital
integrated circuits. The work was subject to two important,
practical constraints:
I) Owing to limited resources, detailed study would be
confined to a limited number of Low Power Schottky
Transistor-Transistor Logic (LSTTL) devices. (These devices
are extensively employed in modern flight systems.)
2) The study would employ only that semiconductor
reliability data available to the general public. (Superior
data lies within the semiconductor houses but is, in general,
not available to the avionics designer.)
As the informed reader might suspect, it was quickly
determined that the latter reliability data was of very
limited usefulness in terms of fault model development.*
*At the time, workers at Hughes aircraft independently
reached the same conclusion. See Reference I.
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For this reason, the originally-planned research activities
were supplemented with laboratory stress testing of select
LSTTL devices.
The remainder of this report is organized as discussed in the
following.
Section 2.0 explains in detail what is meant by "fault
model" and discusses past approaches to realizing fault
models. Limitations of these models are discussed.
Section 3.0 presents definitions of semiconductor
failure mechanisms and failure modes. Results of a USC
survey and analysis of available failure mechanism and mode
data bases are presented.
Section 4.0 describes several approaches to fault model
development including use of semiconductor failure mode data
and extrapolation of failure mechanism data. The section
also contains a description of the test methodology and
results of USC semiconductor stress testing.
Section 5.0 presents conclusions and indicated research
directions.
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2.0 Pin-Level Fault Modelling in Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis and Testing
2.1 Pin Level Fault Model
Figure 2-1 shows the package outline of a
general LSTTL device. In every device, two pins are
dedicated to power supply source and return. The remaining
pins are inputs and outputs. Under unfaulted conditions the
device will output a predictable set of logic states (and/or
state transitions) given a set of input states (and/or
transitions) and (for sequential logic devices) a set of
internal states. If there are failures internal to the
device, output may be incorrect. To effect a pin-level fault
model for the device, electrical characteristics at one or
more pins are altered in such a manner that the resulting
"new" device behaves exactly the same as the corresponding
device with the internal failure.
In a FMEA these characteristics are introduced
analytically. In a FMET, special circuitry is interposed
between the good device and the system circuitry as shown in
Figure 2-2 and altered characteristics are electrically
introduced at the device pins. (Reference 2 & 3.)
This report focuses on approaches (and limitations) for
determining these pin-level characteristics for failures that
can occur within the device. (The term "fault modelling" is
used in this report to describe this process.)
2.2 Gate-Level Fault Models
Prior to the introduction of integrated circuit logic
(almost 30 years ago) it was relatively simple to correllate
physical failures with the altered behavior of logic
components. For example, the relay of Figure 2-3a could be
associated with four fault characteristics: contact stuck-
open, contact stuck-closed, coil short-circuited and coil
open-circuited. Discrete component logic could be handled in
a similar manner. For example, in the discrete component,
diode-transistor-logic (DTL) gate of Figure 2-3b, one could
directly associate known physical failures (open and shorted
resistors, open diodes, collector-base opens, open solder
joints, etc.) with behavior at the input/output terminals of
the circuit.
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The first digital integrated circuits consisted of
single gates (such as the DTL gate of Figure 2-3b)
implemented on a single chip. For reasons to be explained
shortly (Section 3.3), on-chip physical failure mechanisms
could not be translated to behavior at the output terminals.
Instead, physical failures were considered in terms of
altered behavior at the gate inputs and outputs which could
be stuck-at-l, stuck-at-0, open-circuited or short-
circuited. Realistic FMEAs and FMETs could be performed for
early systems employing these small scale, integrated gates
by successively applying each of these failure
characteristics to each pin in the logic circuit.
2.3 Limitations of Gate-Level Fault Models
This report is concerned with fault modelling of
commercial, non-custom MSI, LSI and VLSI digital
semiconductor devices. (As noted, USC detailed studies were
confined to LSTTL SSI and MSI devices. Findings with these
specific devices appear however to apply to higher levels of
integration and to other semiconductor technologies.) In
attempting to apply classical, gate-level fault modelling to
this class of devices, one encounters several practical
roadblocks:
i) With a few exceptions, semiconductor manufacturers
do not provide gate-level circuit schematics of their
integrated devices. Consequently, one cannot perform a gate-
level FMEA.
2) With early gate-level circuitry, it was possible to
perform fault insertions (as a part of FMET) by opening
and/or shorting gate inputs and outputs. In MSI and LSI,
gates are integrated on the chip with the result that
internal gate imputs and outputs cannot be physically
accessed.
3) As will be seen in the next section, failure
mechanisms within the device can lead to failure modes other
than open-circuit, short-circuit and stuck-at behavior at the
device pins.
3.0 Semiconductor Failure Mechanisms and Modes
3.1 Definitions
In what follows, the term failure mechanism refers to a
physical anomaly within the device. Failure mode refers to
altered electrical characteristics and/or behavior as a
result of occurrence of the failure mechanism.
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For example, a broken wire bond is a failure
mechanism. It produces an open circuit failure mode at the
pin to which it is connected.
3.2 Survey of Available Failure Mode and Failure
Mechanism Data Bases
USC conducted a survey among some ten semiconductor
manufacturers and three avionics firms in an effort to obtain
failure mechanism and failure mode data to support pin-level
fault modelling of select LSTTL devices. In the course of
this survey, it was determined that these data are also
collected by the DOD-sponsored Reliability Analysis Center
(RAC) located at Griffiss AFB in New York.
Between the semiconductor manufacturers and the RAC,
there is a copious amount of available data on digital
semiconductor failure mechanisms. Failure mode data on the
other hand is another matter. It is available only (with a
few exceptions) from RAC which periodically publishes failure
mechanism and failure mode data by semiconductor technology.
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 respectively summarize LSTTL failure
mechanism and failure mode data taken from two RAC reports as
referenced. Note that, in terms of the objectives of the
study (to obtain pin level models of digital devices), these
data represent the best* information gathered in the study.
3.3 Analysis of Failure Mechanism Data
With the exception of wirebond failures, it is virtually
impossible to directly correlate semiconductor failure
mechanisms with behavior at the device terminals. (Again, it
is assumed that details of the chip circuitry and layout are
not known.) The reason for this is that die defects (or
package defects that lead to die contamination) can be very
local (e.g. bad metal contact on a single emitter) or
regional (e.g. an oxide contamination effecting several
transistors). With each defect, the digital circuit
structure can be altered. Given the range of possible
combinations of defects one is inclined to speculate that a
device could exhibit every possible combination of outputs
for any given input (and input history in the case of a
sequential circuit).
*we had originally hoped to find failure mode data for each
chip type. Unfortunately, (RAC) published data on each
device type is too fragmentary to attach any statistical
significance to the distribution of failure modes of any
given device.
I0
TABLE 3-1 - LSTTL Failure Mechanisms
(SSI and MSI Devices)
Failure Mechanism
(By Component)
Die :
Bulk Aspects
Metallization
Oxide/Dielectric
Surface
1984 RAC Report (Ref. 4)
No. of
Devices
Percentage
68 25.1
15
38
I0
5
Interconnects:
Wire
Wirebond
24
9
15
8.8
Package:
Seal
Lid
Die Attach Bond
179
116
54
9
66.1
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TABLE 3-2 - LSTTL Device Failure Modes (Ref. 4)
(SSI and MSI Devices)
Failure Mode
Percent
of Total Adjusted**
OPEN
SHORT
DEGRADED
Unknown*
Leakage
Parameter Out-of-Tolerance
3.4 3.4
4.1 4.1
22.4 22.4
3.4 0.0
6.1 7.2
12.9 15.2
FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY 70.1 70.1
Unknown 57.2 0.0
Non-Functional 2.7 14.8
Improper Output 9.5 51.6
Stuck-at-i 0.0 0.0
Stuck-at-0 0.7 3.7
*"Unknown" means failure mode was in major category (DE-
GRADED or FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY) but sub-category (leakage, im-
proper output, etc.) is not known.
**Unknowns allocated to known categories in proportion to
known percentages of total.
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3.4 Analysis of Failure Mode Data
Unlike failure mechanism data, failure mode data
(Table 3-2) describe faulted behavior at the device pins.
What stands out most in the table is that the majority of
failure modes in LSTTL are not the classical open, short and
stuck- at modes but functional, parametric and leakage
failures. (Table 3-3, prepared from the" same RAC report,
shows expectedly, that failure modes for the obsolescent DTL
technology fall principally in the former category.)
Excess leakage and parameter out-of-tolerance failure
modes could have three effects in an operational digital
flight system:
i) If sufficiently severe, they could produce a hard or
permanent device failure.
2) If borderline, they could produce a soft or intermittent
device failure. (In working with LSTTL devices, one
occasionally encounters what's called a "flaky chip": a
device that works correctly most of the time but not always.)
3) If below fault-activating thresholds, the device could be
expected to function properly but with reduced life.
It is observed that in both DTL and LSTTL implementations,
leakage and parametic failures can constitute a significant
portion of latent faults. Unlike the "stuck-bit" latent
fault, leakage and parametric failure modes could conceivably
be missed in preflight built-in-test yet become activated in
the harsher environment of flight.
LSTTL failure mode data of Table 3-4 for both life test and
field application would seem to indicate the presence of such
latent faults in fielded equipment. It is important to
qualify this latter statement as well as all of the RAC data
related to LSTTL failure modes. Specifically the failure
mode distributions of Table 3-2 correspond to a limited
number of devices that does not span the full range of device
types. Table 3-5 shows significantly different failure mode
distributions for two separate LSTTL samples, one taken in
1984 (the data of Table 3-2) and another taken in 1980
(Reference 5). (As suggested by Table 3-6, this
difference in distributions does not appear to apply to DTL.)
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3.4 Analysis of Failure Mode Data
Unlike failure mechanism data, failure mode data
(Table 3-2) describe faulted behavior at the device pins.
What stands out most in the table is that the majority of
failure modes in LSTTL are not the classical open, short and
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modes could have three effects in an operational digital
flight system:
i) If sufficiently severe, they could produce a hard or
permanent device failure.
2) If borderline, they could produce a soft or intermittent
device failure. (In working with LSTTL devices, one
occasionally encounters what's called a "flaky chip": a
device that works correctly most of the time but not always.)
3) If below fault-activating thresholds, the device could be
expected to function properly but with reduced life.
It is observed that in both DTL and LSTTL implementations,
leakage and parametic failures can constitute a significant
portion of latent faults. Unlike the "stuck-bit" latent
fault, leakage and parametric failure modes could conceivably
be missed in preflight built-in-test yet become activated in
the harsher environment of flight.
LSTTL failure mode data of Table 3-4 for both life test and
field application would seem to indicate the presence of such
latent faults in fielded equipment. It is important to
qualify this latter statement as well as all of the RAC data
related to LSTTL failure modes. Specifically the failure
mode distributions of Table 3-2 correspond to a limited
number of devices that does not span the full range of device
types. Table 3-5 shows significantly d_fferent failure mode
distributions for two separate LSTTL samples, one taken in
1984 (the data of Table 3-2) and another taken in 1980
(Reference 5). (As suggested by Table 3-6, this
difference in distributions does not appear to apply to DTL.)
TABLE 3-3 - DTL Failure Modes (Ref. 4)
Failure Mode
Percent
of Total
Percent
Adjusted**
OPEN
SHORT
0.0
6.2
0.0
6.2
DEGRADED 18.8 18.8
Unknown* 15.6
Leakage 1.6
Parameter Out-of-Tolerance 1.6
0.0
9.4
9.4
FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY 75.0 75.0
Unknown 46.9 0.0
Non-Functional 1.6 4.2
Improper Output 1.6 4.2
Stuck-at-i 10.8 29.1
Stuck-at-0 14.1 37.5
*"Unknown" means failure mode was in major category (DE-
GRADED or FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY) but sub-category (leakage, im-
proper output, etc.) is not known.
**Unknowns allocated to known categories in proportion to
known percentages of total.
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TABLE 3-4 - LSTTL Device Failure Modes
Life Test vs. Field
Life Test Field
Failure Mode
Percent
of Total
Percent
of Total
OPEN 3.5
4.5
SHORT
2.8 4.5
DEGRADED 22.4
i0.7
FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY 71.3 80.3
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TABLE 3-5 - LSTTL Device Failure Modes
(SSI and MSI Devices)
Comparison of 1984 and 1980 Data
Failure Mode
Percent Percent
of Total of Total
1984 Data 1980 Data
(147 Devices) (450 Devices)
OPEN 3.4 0.0
SHORT 4.1 0.4
DEGRADED 22.4 84.7
FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY 70.1 14.9
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TABLE 3-6 - DTL Device Failure Modes
Comparison of 1984 and 1980 Data
Failure Mode
Percent
of Total
1984 Data
(64 Devices)
Percent
of Total
1980 Data
(59 Devices)
OPEN 0.0 0.0
SHORT 6.2 0.0
DEGRADED 18.8 20.3
FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY 75.0 77.7
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4.0 Developing Pin-Level Device Models
4.1 Overview
Given the severe constraint that one does not "know" what's
inside the semiconductor package, fault modelling becomes
more art than science. This section, therefore, describes
various approaches (employed by USC and others) which can be
invoked collectively to develop a pin-level fault model. The
approaches consist of device modelling based on,
(i) failure mechanisms
(2) failure mode data
(3) device stress testing
(4) functional modelling
4.2 Model Elements Based on Failure Mechanisms
4.2.1 Interconnects
Interconnect failure mechanisms consist of broken wire
and detachment of die-pad and/or lead-frame wire bonds.
These mechanisms can be modelled by:
I) introducing single (i.e. one-at-a-time) open-circuits at
each pin.
2) introducing single short circuits across adjacent pins.
(These two failure modes are also discussed in Section 4.3)
4.2.2 Die Defects/Package Failures
As discussed in Section 3.3, die defects and package
failures can lead to a virtually infinite combination of
incorrect signal outputs.
With SSI devices and (to a limited extent) MSI
devices, all combinations could be considered (in FMEA) and
inserted (in FMET) provided that circuit complexity is low.
In complex circuits employing both MSI and LSI devices, such
exhaustive testing is impractical. As a result one must
consider altering outputs by randomly selecting a subset of
total combinations or employing a set of "worst case"
combinations based upon the specific circuit design.
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4.3 Model Elements Based on Failure Mode Data
4.3.1 Open Circuits
Based on the 1984 RAC data, open circuits (pin- to-pad)
constitute some 3% of total failure modes (Table 3-2).
(Wire bond data in Table 3-1 tends to collaborate this
fraction.) Note that open-circuit failure modes are single
failures.
4.3.2 Short Circuits
Short circuits would include single shorts of adjacent
pins.
4.3.3 Excess Leakage and Out-of-Tolerance
Parameters
Note that failure mode data applies to leakages and
parameters at the pins. We are of the belief that equivalent
(for FMEA) or actual (for FMET) analog interface circuitry
could be interposed between device pins and socket host to
effect excess leakages and out- of-tolerance voltage levels,
switching characteristics and delays. (This "parasitic
circuit" model has, to date, not been pursued in the study.)
Failure modes here would be single and multiple. With the
same considerations discussed in Section 4.2.2, fault
insertion testing involving all possible combinations of
leakage currents and parameter values is not practical for
complex circuitry. One would accordingly have to randomly
select combinations or, where possible, select "worst case"
combinations based on the design at hand.
4.3.4 Functional Anomalies
The non-functional chip, improper output and latched-
output failure modes can be modelled using the classical
"stuck-at" approaches. Again, one faces a virtually infinite
number of fault combinations for MSI and LSI devices employed
in complex circuitry.
4.4 Semiconductor Device Stress Testing
4.4.1 Rationale Behind Semiconductor Stress
Testing
The failure modes termed "degraded" in Table 3-2 are the
result of altered transistor gains, switching thresholds,
changed (diffused) resistance values and excess leakage
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current. (Responsible failure mechanisms would include
marginal semiconductor doping concentrations and/or die bulk
and surface contamination.) As seen in Table 4-1, these
circuit parameters are all temperature dependent.
Consequently by operating an LSTTL device outside of its
specified operating temperature limits* it is possible to
induce failure of the device.
4.4.2 Experimental Setup
USC students set up a high-temperature burn-in rig with
which digital integrated circuits could be operated and
monitored from room temperature up to 200 degrees Celsius.
Three LSTTL device types and one TTL device type were
selected** for high temperature testing:
74LS138
74174
74LS257
74LS194
I-of-8-DECODER/DEMULTIPLEXER
HEX D-TYPE FLIP FLOPS
QUAD 2-TO-1 MULTIPLEXER
4-BIT SHIFT REGISTER
Burn-in circuits for these devices are shown in Figure 4-1.
4.4.3 Stress Testing Results
All devices tested were commercial components having a
maximum operating temperature*** of 70 degrees Celsius.
The following describes results of operating the
devices at elevated temperatures. (Device data sheets are
presented in Appendix A.)
*These limits define the temperature range over which the
device manufacturer guarantees minimum and maximum parameter
values.
**These device types were concurrently being employed in
fault insertion experiments at NASA Ames Research Center.
***As noted earlier, this is the temperature beyond which
the manufacturer will not guarantee minimum and maximum
parameter values.
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TABLE 4-1
Transistor Parameters vs. Temperature
Typical Values
units _ 25c 70c
Resistance
(Diffused Resistor)
Ohms 320 360 450
(DC) Current Gain dim. 65 i00 200
LeakageCurrent nA I0 70 300
Input Voltage Threshold Volts 0.95 0.82 0.70
21
mo
I
L
FIGURE 4-1a BURN-IN CIRCUIT FOR THE 74LS138
22
_V
I
J ,
L
m
Da IQ
O_ IZl
---- I1._ 12
I
!
|
_V
0<
_jC_
MN
m
m
FIGURE 4-1b BURN-IN CIRCUIT FOR THE 74174
23
uFIGURE 4-ic BURN-IN CIRCUIT FOR THE 74LS257
24
jD, _u
DJ _ ---
;s _S.--
SV
O
--2
FIGURE 4-1d BURN-IN CIRCUIT FOR THE 74LS194
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When testing the 74LS138, five different devices
were tested under high temperature tests and the following
results were obtained: In the first test, all of the outputs
stuck high from 170 to 200 degrees Celsius. In the second
test, all of the outputs stuck high from 170 to 200 degrees
Celsius. For the other three tests, the circuits performed
exactly as they were supposed to for temperatures from 20 to
200 degrees Celsius.
When testing the 74174, five different devices were
tested and the following results were obtained: In the first
test, output Q3 stuck low from 180 to 200 degrees Celsius.
In the second test, the clock and output Q5 shorted together
from 180 to 200 degrees Celsius. In the third test, output
Q4 stuck high from 160 to 200 degrees Celsius. In the fourth
test, all outputs stuck low from i00 to 200 degrees Celsius.
In the fifth test, all outputs stuck low from 120 to 200
degrees Celsius.
When testing the 74LS257, five different devices were
tested under high temperature tests and no change in the
outputs was found from 20 to 200 degrees Celsius.
When testing the 74LS194, five different devices were
tested under high temperature conditions and the following
results were obtained: In the first test, outputs Q0, QI,
and Q2 were stuck high in the hold mode at 190 degrees
Celsius. In the second test, all of the outputs stuck high
at 200 degrees Celsius. In the third test, all of the
outputs stuck high at 80 degrees Celsius. In the fourth
test, all outputs were stuck high in the shift left mode at
200 degrees Celsius. In the fifth test, outputs Q1 and Q3
were stuck high in the parallel load mode from 80 to 200
degrees Celsius.
The foregoing test results are summarized in Table 4-
2.
Appendix B shows the truth tables for each of the
failed devices made at the time the device was failed.
Note that all of the faults induced were permanent faults.
(No attempt was made in the experiments to induce
intermittent faults.)
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TABLE 4-2
Semiconductor Device Stress Testing Results
DEVICE TYPE DEVICE NO.
74LS138 I, 2
3, 4, 5
RESULTS
ALL OUTPUTS STUCKHIGH
NO FAILURES
74174 1 Q3 STUCK LOW
CLOCK AND Q5 SHORTED
Q4 STUCK HIGH
4, 5 ALL OUTPUTS STUCK LOW
74LS257 i, 2, 3, 4, 5 NO FAILURES
Q0, QI, Q2 STUCK HIGH
2 ALL OUTPUTS STUCK HIGH
74LS194 3 ALL OUTPUTS STUCK HIGH
ALL OUTPUTS STUCK HIGH
(IN LEFT SHIFT MODE)
Q1 AND Q3 STUCK HIGH
(IN PARALLEL LOAD MODE)
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4.5 Functional Fault Modelling
Given that gates in an LSI device are inaccessable (i.e.
analytically in FMEA; physically in FMET), many workers have
opted to employ functional models in performing fault free
and fault insertion simulations (e.g. see References 6, 7 &
8). Functional fault modelling, quite simply, consists of
altering pin states (in simulation during FMEA; or in real
time during FMET) such that the function of the (individual
or sets of) pins is defeated. Table 4-3 shows functional
faults for a select number* of LSTTL devices along with the
corresponding alteration of pin states. Note that some of
the fault insertions in the table require that pin states be
changed instantaneously. (For example, the insertion "invert
state" in Table 4-3a requires that the corresponding pin
state must be monitored and changed.) While "instantaneous"
changes are feasible in simulation, they may be impossible to
achieve in physical fault insertion
particularly where victim circuit speeds equal or exceed that
of the insertion circuitry. Finally, it is noted that the
fault insertions of Table 4-3 can occur as single or multiple
faults and as well as being permanent or intermittent in
duration.
4.6 Summary
As noted in the introduction to this section, a fault
model for an LSTTL device would incorporate all of the
approaches described above. These are summarized in Table 4-
4 which also shows corresponding failure modes.
5.0 Conclusions and Indicated Research Directions
As a result of our investigations, we find that
semiconductor failure mechanism data is abundant but of
little use in developing pin level device models. Failure
mode data on the other hand does exist but is too sparse to
be of any (statistical) use in developing fault models.
What is significant in the failure mode data is that,
unlike classical logic, MSI and LSI devices do exhibit more
than "stuckat" and open/short failure modes. Specifically
they are dominated by parametric failures and functional
anomalies that can include intermittent faults and multiple
pin failures.
*These device types were concurrently being employed in fault
insertion experiments at NASA Ames Research Center.
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TABLE 4-3a FUNCTIONAL FAULT MODELLING
2901 MICROPROCESSOR SLICE
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Register select failure (A port)
II
II
11
Register select failure (B port)
11
11
I!
Microinstruction decode fail
11
11
I!
11
11
11
II
I!
Correct data shift fail (Q req.)
I!
4 (A0)
3 (AI)
2 (A2)
1 (A3)
17 (B0)
18 (BI)
19 (B2)
20 (B3)
12 (I0)
13 (II)
14 (I2)
26 (I3)
28 (I4)
27 (I5)
5 (I6)
7 (I7)
6 (I8)
8
9
invert state
11
I!
l!
I!
I!
l!
II
II
I!
I!
I!
11
!!
l!
11
I!
open
l!
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TABLE 4-3a FUNCTIONAL FAULT MODELLING
2901 MICROPROCESSOR SLICE
(CONTINUED)
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Correct (Y) output fail 36 invert
state
,, 37 "
,, 38 "
,, 39 "
Output disable* 40 S-a-I
Carry generate/prop fail 32 invert
state
" 35 "
Overflow (false) fail 34 S-a-i
ALU zero (false) fail II S-a-i
ALU MSB out fail 31 invert
state
Carry-in fail 29 S-a-I
Clock fail 15 S-a-I
,, 15 S-a-0
*Tied low on all 2901 chips.
3O
TABLE 4-3b Functional Fault Modelling
2911 Microprogram Sequencer
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Address source select fail
state
I!
Push/pop stock oper. fail
11
Internal reg. select fail
Zero enable fail
Zero disable fail
Y-enable fail
Y-disable fail
Incrementer carry-in fail
i0
II
19
20
3
9 (zero)
9
16
16
17
6
invert
t!
It
It
S-a-i
S-a-i
S-a-0
S-a-i
S-a-0
S-a-0
invert state
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TABLE 4-3c Functional Fault Modelling
2918 Quad D Register
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Y enable fail 7 (OE) S-a-i
Y disable fail 7 (OE) S-a-0
Clock fail 9 (CP) S-a-0
Correct Q output fail 2 (Q0) invert state
,, 5 (QI) "
,, Ii (Q2) "
,, 14 (Q3) "
CorrectY output fail 3 (Y0) invert state
(when pin 7 : 0)
,, 6 (YI) "
,, i0 (Y2) "
,, 13 (Y3) "
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TABLE 4-3d Functional Fault Modelling
54LS253 Dual 4-Input Multiplexer
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Chip enable fail
I!
Chip disable fail
11
Channel select fail
state
i!
Correctoutput fail
1 (Mux 1 enable)
15 (Mux 2 enable)
1
15
14 (select 0)
2 (select I)
7 (Mux 1 out)
9 (Mux 2 out)
S-a-I
I!
S-a-O
I!
invert
11
invert
when
pin 1 = 0
invert
when
pin 15 = 0
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TABLE 4-3e Functional Fault Modelling
54LS02 - Quad NOR
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Fails to perform NOR
state
TABLE 4-3f
1 (A output)
4 (B output)
i0 (C output)
13 (D output)
Functional Fault Modelling
54LS00 - Quad NAND
Invert
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
PIN FAULT
Fails to perform NAND
state
I!
11
11
3 (A output)
6 (B output)
8 (C output)
ii (D output)
Invert
34
TABLE 4-3g Functional Fault Modelling
5404 Hex Inverter
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
Fails to invert
state
11
11
I!
B!
11
PIN
1 (A input)
3 (B input)
5 (C input)
9 (D input)
ii (E input)
13 (F input)
FAULT
Invert
1!
I!
!!
!!
1!
35
\
TA'_E 4-3e
\
\\
\
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
Fails to perform NOR
state
TABLE 4-3f
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
Functional Fault Modelling
54LS02 - Quad NOR
\h
\
\
\
PIN
\ 1 (A output),/
\
', 4 (B output)
\,
'\,!0 (C o_tput)
i_, (D'output)
Function_ Faul_t Modelling
54LS00. " Quad NAND
'\
\,
\
PIN "
\
Fails to perform NAND
state /
//
/
l! ,/_
/
II
t'l
i
I
/
/
/
3 (A output
6 (B output)
8 (C output)
II (D output)
34
/'
i
i
//
/
.!
FAUL_ /
J
/
/
/
Invert
FAULT
_Invert
\
\
",<
"\\
\
\.
\,
\
\L
FUNCTIONAL FAULT
INSERTION
Fails to invert
state
/'
/
]
/
!
/
/
//
r¸
/
/"
/
/
2"
/
/
/
/
/
/"
\,
\
\
\
\
\<
\
TABLE _-3g
\
d
J
/
/
/
/
//
/
/
./
/
Functional Fault Modelling
<5404 Hex Inverter
\
\\/
/
; \\
PIN FAULT
\
\ 1 (A input)
\
II
13
Invert
I!
i<input ) "
(D _put ) "
(E in_t) ',',
\
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TABLE 4-4 - LSTTL Failure Modes and Fault Models
Failure Mode Fault Model
Functional Anomaly
Degraded (At Pins)
Degraded (On Chip)
Opens
Shorts
Functional Fault Model
(FMEA); Model Generated
Fault Patterns (FMET)
Parasitic Circuit
Device Stress Tests to
Corroborate Functional
Fault Model
Open-Circuit Pin
Short-Circuit Adjacent
Pins
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It is certainly possible, and this report discusses the
methods, to develop pin-level models based on extrapolation
of semiconductor device failure mechanisms, failure modes,
results of (temperature) stress testing and functional
modelling. Such a composite model would include credible
faults that could be experienced by the device.
Unfortunately, the number of such faults would be
insignificant when compared to the (virtually infinite)
number of possible fault patterns. At issue here is the fact
that one could insert all the faults in a composite model and
yet gain no accurate measure of fault detection coverage
and/or fault latency times. I.e. one could demonstrate fault
tolerance yet come away with no measures of the degree of
fault tolerance.
The foregoing prompt several research questions:
I) Although single-pin "stuck-at" or open/short permanent
fault insertions do not characterize the modern MSI and LSI
device, can they be legitimately* employed to cover actual
failure modes that might be experienced?
2) Is it possible to obtain a definition of coverage and
coverage measures with a device which can exhibit permanent
or intermittent failures at one or more device pins?
3) Is one better off considering failure patterns at
electrical connection boundaries other than integrated
circuit pins (e.g. data busses, I/O lines, etc.)?
*The approach is extensively used today with FMEA.
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APPENDIX A
DEVICE DATA SHEETS
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TYPES SN54174, SN54175, SN54LS174. SN54LS175, SN54S174, SN54S175,
SN74174. SN74175, SN74LS174. SN74LS175, SN74S174, SN74S175
HEX/QUADRUPLE D-TYPE FLIP-FLOPS WITH CLEAR
L,L LE_rr,, Nn m-L :5 7,51 !RO3 OECEMBE_ 197_-aEVISEO OCTOEIER 1976
'_ "174, 'LS174, '$174 HEX D-TYPE FLIP-FLOPS
'175, 'LS175, '$175 . . . QUADRUPLE D-TYPE FLIP-FLOPS
• '174 "LS174, 'S174 Contain Six Flip-Flops
with Single-Rail Outputs
'175, 'LS175. '$175 Contain Four Flip-Flops
with Double-Rail Outputs
= Three Performance Ranges Offered: See
Table Lower Right
- Buffered Clock and Direct Clear Inputs
Individual Data Input to Each Flip-Flop
• Applications include:
Buffer/Storage Registers
Shift Registers
Pattern Generators
uascription
These monolithic, p0s=tlve-eclge-trlggered flip-flops
utilize TTL circuitry to implement O-type flip-floD
logic All have a direct clear input, and the '175,
'LS175, and '$175 feature complementary outputs
from eacn flip-flops.
information at the O inputs meetincj the setup time
requirements is transferred to the Q outputs on the
_os_twe-gomg edge of the clock pulse. Clock
triggermcj occurs at a particular voltage level and is
not directly related to the transition time of the
oositlve-_loln(_ pulse• When the clock input is at either
the hiQh or low level, the D input sicjnal has no effect
at the PUtOUt.
These circuits are fully compatible for use with most
TTL or DTL circuits.
FUNCTION TABLE
lEACH FLIP-FLOP)
INPUTS ,I OUTPUTS lCLEAR CLOCK O I O Qr
L ×
H
H
H L
t_ , Jow *eve1 _stesov _tatl_
X = _rrele_V_n¢
• - tran_,t,on from low zo n,qn _evel
xiL IH H LL L H
x 0o do
_ - t_e _eve_ of Q before the _ncSzcateO steeOy-state
,-out conO,t_ons were eSZSOI,sn=O
= 175 "LS175. ancJ '$175 onlv
SN54174 SN54LS174, SN545174 . . . J OR W PACKAGE
SN74174, SN74LS174 SN74S174 .. . J OR N PACKAGE
(TOP VIEW)
vcc so 6o so _o 4D 4o CL(_K
por_tzve logic: see function ladle
SN54175. SN54LS175, SN54S175 ... J OR W PACKAGE
SN74175. SN74LS175, $N74S175 . . . J OR N PACKAGE
ITOP VI EWI
vcc =_ 4_ Jo 30 _ _o ccocx
1 2 3 4 , 6 7 8
CL_ io IQ io ,,o ;0 zo GND
pos|tivl Io91¢: see function raDIi
TYPICAL TYPICAL
MAXIMUM POWER
TYPES
CLOCK DISSIPATION
FREQUENCY PER FLIP-FLOP
• 174. ' 175 35 MHz 38 mW
'L_174, 'LS175 40 MHz 14 mw
"St 74. 'S175 110 MHz 75 rnW
I
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
INCORPORAFIEO
54LS174 Hex D-Type Flip
7-253 ,
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Rockwell-
Collins I COMPONENT MAINTENANCE
MANUAL
FCC-201
PART NO 622-4967-001
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
TIlE 2911 IS A FOUT-BIT WIDE AOORESS CONTROLLER IN_DED FOR SEQUENCING THR(_JGH A SERIES OF MICROINSTRU_TIONS CONTAINED IN A
OR PRON. TRO 2911'S MAY BE INTERACTED TO GENERATE AN EIGHT-BIT iLDORESS (256 WOROS), ANO THREE NAY BE USED TO GENERATE A
I'_LVE-BIT ,_ORESS (4K WOROS).
THE 2911 CAN 3ELECT ADORESS FROM ANY OF THREE SOURCES. THEY ARE:. 1) _ SET OF EXTERNAL OIRECT IM=UTS (O)i 2.,!. _' FOUR-nORO OEE__ _
PUSH/POP STACX; OR _)) A PROGRAN COUHTER REGISTER (?_ICH USUALLY (.UN! tN THE LAST ADORESS PLUS CI'IE). THE PU_::_H/POPSLACK INCLUOE5
CERTAIN CONTROL LIh'ES SO THAT IT CAN EFFtCIEN'n.Y EXECUTE NESTED SUBROUTINE LINKAGES, A SEPARATE LINE FORCES THE OUTPUTS TO ALL
ZEROES. THE OUTPUTS ARE THREE-STATE.
MICROPROGR.,IM SEQUENCER BLOCK DIAGR_
REGI STER
E_ASLE) AODRESS REG/HOLD ING REG
OI RECT
INPUT S
O >
4
4
0 AR F uP(;
so :.
14JLT IPLEXER
S1 ;
X1 X2
OUTROT
CONTROL
0E
PUSH/POP F I LE ENABLE
y PUP I_ Cn. 4 Cn 0_ Y3 Y2 Y1 YO Sl
II kA I1
ce vcc _ o3 o2 01 % GNO _ So
INPUTS TO 2911
N ICROPROGRA_
COUNTER
REGI STER
I NCRE)eENTER
I
Cn Cn÷4
Sl,SO
i_,l='UP
ZERO
@
Cn
0 i
CP
CONTROL LINES FOR ADORESS SOURCE SFIECTION
CONTROL LINES FOR PU_/POP STACK
E]dAB_E LINE FOR INTE_AL /_ORESS REGISTER
LOGIC _ INPUT ON THE OUTPUT LINES
OUTPUT ENABLE. _ 0"_ IS NIGH, THE Y
OUTPUTS ARE OFF (HIGH IMPEDANCE)
CIRRY-IN TO THE INCR'E_E_,ITER
OIRECT INPUTS TO _ MULTIPLEXER
CLOCK INPUT TO _ AR AND uPC REGISTER _O
PU_H -POP STACK.
OUTPUTS FROM THE 2911
Yi _ORESS OUTPUTS FROM 2911. (I_DRESS
INPUTS TO CONTROL MEY_RY. )
Cn,, 4 CARRY OUT FROM 'THE INCRD4D, ITER
EXTERNAL TO THE 2911
A ABORESS TO THE CONTROL _EMORY
I(A) INSTRUCTION IN CONTROL ME)tORY AT _ESS A
uWR CONTI_TS OF A MICROttORO REGISTER (AT
OUTPUT OF CONTROL HEHORY ). THE N ICROWORO
REGISTER CONTAINS THE INSTRUCTION CURRENTLY
BEING EXECUTED.
Tn TIME I_RI00 (CYCLE) n
TP6-5385-014
4-Bit Controller Type 2911
A-5
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
THE FOUR-BIT BIPOLAR MICROPROCESSOR SLICE IS
OESIC4CEO AS A HIGH SPEED CASCAOABLE ELEMENT O-_ Y3 Y2 YI YO
,NTENOEO FOR USE ,N CPU'S. PERIPHERAL CONTROLLERS. [--I I_
PROGRAMMABLE M ICROPROCESSORS ANO Nt.EROUS OTHER F-] [--I [_
IiI'
,P iCAT,ONsTHE.,CRO,NST CT,ONFLEX,B,LI 
OF THE 2901A RILL ALLOW EFFICIENT EMULATION OF 39 37 36
ALMOST AHY DIGITAL COMPUTING MACHINE. THE DEVICE.
AS SHOWN IN THE Bt.OCK DIAGRAM BELOW, CONSISTS OF
A16-RORO BY 4-BIT TWO-PORT RAM, A HIGH-SPEED ALU,
/&NO THE ASSOCIATE0 SHIFTING, OECOOING ANO MULTI-
PLEXING CIRCUITRY. THE NINE-BIT HICROlNSTRUCTION
WORD IS ORGANIZED INTO THREE Gr_)uPS OF THREE BITS
EACH AND SELECTS THE ALU SOURCE 0PERANOS. THE ALU
FUNCTION, ANO THE ALU DESTINATION REGISTER. THE
MICROPROCESSOR IS CASCI_AflLE WITH FULL I.OOK-ANEAD 2 4 5
oRw,THR,P E THREE-STATEOU S. U U U U U
AND PROVIOES VARIOUS STATUS FlAG OUTIMJTS FROM A3 A2 AT AO 16
THE ALU
CONNECTION DIAGRAM
TOP VIEW
i 3_4 3_13432 31 30 29 28 27 26 24 23 22 21
? 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 1B 19
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
18 I7 RAM3 RAMoVc{" F=O Io 11 12 CP O3 BO B1 B2 83
PIN OEFIN.I TIONS
CLOCK
MICROPROCESSOR SLICE BL0CX DIAGRAM
111
_lTI6 St'[_ _],lo
IDESTINATION I ALU I _U
lCONTROLI  CT'ONt  RCE
MICRO INSTRUCT ION DECODE
-_I '8' OATA IN
(READ)
__._' A' ADDRESS CP,_30RESS
_RAM
i16 AODRESSABLE
'B' ._..__. IREGI STERS
ADDrEss(READ/WRITE).___'B' ADDRESS
/ =A' 'B'
f DATADATA[ _ OUT
O I RECT
DATA I N
CARRY IN
OUTPUT --------=
ENABLE
O A B $ Q
ALU DATA SOURCE SELECTOR
R
R S
ClN
6- FUNCT ION ALU
-I
J
A F
OUTPUT DATA SELECTOR
Y
_TA OUT
I
,I
F Q
Q REGISTER
O
p
(SIGH)
AO.3
SO-3
10-8
%
DO-3
YO-3
OVR
F=O
F3
Cn
Cn.4
CP
THE FOUR AOORESS INPUTS TO _ REGISTER STACK USED TO
SELECT ONE REGISTER h_OSE CONTENTS ARE DISPLAYED
THROUGH THE A-PORT.
THE FOUR AOORESS INPUTS TO THE REGISTER STACK USED TO
SELECT ONE REGISTER _-_OSE CONTENTS ARE 01SPLAYED THROUGH
THE B-PORT AND INTO WHICH NEW DATA CAN BE WRITTE}_
THE CLOCK GOES LOW.
THE NINE INS_CTION CONTROL LINES TO THE 2901A. USED
TO DETERMINE _-IAT OATA SOURCES WILL BE _=PLIED TO THE
ALU (1{]12), V_-tAT FUHCTION THE ALU WILL PERFORM (1345),
AND _'HAT DATA IS TO 8E 0F.POSITED IN THE Q-REGISTER OR
THE REGISTER STACK ( 1678 )
A SHIFT LINE AT THE MSB OF THE Q REGISTER (Qx) AND THE
REGISTER STACK (RAM3). ELECTR_DALLY THESE LTNES ARE
THREE-STATE OUTPUTS CONNECTED TO TTL II_°UTS INTERNAL TO
THE 2901A, t_-IEN THE DESTINATION CODE ON 167 R INDICATES
AN UP SHIFT (OCTAL 6 OR 7) THE THREE-STATE-01]TPUTS ARE
ENABLED AN{) THE MSB OF THE Q REGISTER IS A_AiLABLE ON THE
Qx PiN AND THE MS8 OF THE N_U OUTPUT IS AVAILABLE ON THE
R_M_PIN. OTHERWISE. THE THREE-STATE OUTPUTS ARE OFF
(HI_H-IMPEDANCE) ANO THE PINS ARE EI.ECTRICALLY LS-TTL
INPUTS. RHEN 1HE DESTINATION CODE CALLS FOR A OCP.N SHIFT
THE PINS ARE USED AS THE DATA INPUTS TO THE MSB OF THE
Q REGISTER (OCTAL 4) AND RAM (OCTAL 4 OR 5).
SHIFT LINES LIKE Q3 AND RAMM, BJT AT THE LSB OF THE Q-
REGISTER AND RAN. THESE PIRS ARE TIED TO THE Q3 ANCI
RAM.= PiNS OF THE ADJACENT DEVICE TO TRANSFER DATA BETWEEN
DEV]'CES FOR UP AND 00_ SHIFTS OF THE Q REGISTER AND ALU
DATA.
DIRECT DATA iNPUTS. A FOUR-BIT FIE'LD nHICH MAY BE
SELECTED AS ONE OF THE _4.U DATA SOURCES FOR ENTERING
DATA INT0 THE 29OIA. DO IS THE LSB..
TNE FOUR DATA OUTPUTS OF" THE 2gO1A. THESE ARE TI-REE-
STATE OUTPUT LINES _t-IEN E}tABLED, THEY DISPLAY EITHER
THE FOUR C%ITPUTS OF THE ALU OR THE DATA ON THE A-RORT OF
THE REGISTER STACK. AS DETERMINED 8Y THE DESTINATION
CODE 1678.
OUTPUT ENAB..E. _ (_ IS HIGH. THE Y OUTI:_JTS ARE OFF;
t'_IE]W(_ IS LOW, THE Y OUTPUTS ARE ACTIVE (HIGH OR LOW).
THE CARRY GENERATE AN0 PROPAGATE OU_TS Ckc THE 29C11A'S
/d_U. THESE SIGNALS ARE USED WITH THE 2902 FOR
CARRY-LOOKANEAD.
OVERFLOW. THIS PIN IS LOGICALLY _ EXCLUSIVE-OR OF
CARRY-IN AN{] CARRY-OUT OF THE MS8 OF THE ALU. AT THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT _ OF THE tIORD, THIS PIN INDICATES
THAT THE RESULT OF AN ARITHHETIC TlqO'S _T OPER-
ATION MAS OVERFLOWED INTO THE SIGN-BIT.
THIS IS AN OPEN COLLECTOR OUTPUT WHIGH GOES HIGH (OFF)
IF THE DATA ON THE FOUR ALU OUTIpUTS Fo. 3 ARE ALL LOW.
IN POSITIVE LOGIC, IT INOICATES THE RESULT OF AN ALU
ORERAT ION IS ZERO.
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ALU OUTPUT BIT.
THE CARRY-IN TO THE 2gO1A'S ALU.
THE CARRY-OUT OF THE 2gO1A'S ALU
THE CLOCK TO THE 2gO1A. _ q REGISTER _ REGISTER
STACK OUTPUTS CHANGE ON THE CLOCK LOW-T0-HIGH TRANSITION.
"i3.1ECLOCK LOW TIME IS INTERNALLY THE WRITE ENABLE TD THE
16 x 4 RAM I_ICH COMPROMISES THE "MASTER" LATCHES OF THE
REGISTER STACK. _HILE THE O..OCK IS LOW, THE "SLAVE"
LATCHES ON THE RAN OUTPUTS ARE CLOSED, STORING THE OATA
PREVIOUSLY ON THE RAH OUTFMJTS. THIS ALLOWS SYNCS
MASTER-SLAVE OPERATION OF THE REGISTER STACK.
2901 Microprocessor Slice
A-6
C4_ERAL 0ESCRIPTt0N
THE291_msA FOUToBIT*,BEmORESSCONTROLLERINTENDEDFORSEOJENCING_ROUON_,SERIESOF MICROINSTRUCT|ONS CONTAINED iN A ROMORF_OM._0 2911'SMAY8E,NTERCO,_CT_TO_ERATEANE,ONT-B,T,_,_ESS(2_ ,,OROS).ANOTHREEMAYBEUSEDTOGENE_TEA
'_O_VE-8,T,O0_ESS(= WO_.
THE2911CANSE_CT _RESSF_MANYO_THREESOURCES.__FyyA_ _')N._S_ OFEXTERNALD,RECT,,PUTS(Q):_2_'_FW_R?,_U_s
PUSH/POP STACK; OR _) A PROGRAM COUNTER REGISTER (WHICH U:WJALL T THE LAST ADDRESS PLUS ONE). THE I-'UbH/rUr_
CERTAIN CONTROL LU'.IES SO THAT tT CAN EFFICIENTLY EXECUTE NESTED SUBROUTINE LINKAGES. A SEPARATE LINE FORCES THE OUTPUTS TO ALL
ZEROES. THE OUTPUTS ARE THREE-STATE.
NICROPROGR/_'I SEQLIE_CER BLOCK DIAGRAM
PUSH/POP FILE ENABLE
Y
ENABLE ADDRESS REG/ :. - STACK
> HOLDING REG POINTER
4 X 4 FILE 1
4 <
OI RECT - CLOCK
INPUTS 4/
so > Mi CROPROGRAM
COUNTER
51 _ REGISTER Cn
CP
OUTPUT J _ I
_ONT_ Y( Y1 _ Y2 _ Y3 Cn Cn, 4
PCNP _ Cn*4 Cn _ Y3 Y2 Y1 YO Sl
19 18 17 18 lS 14 1S 12 11
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LJLJLJULJI ILJULJLJ
c_ vcc _ o_ o2 oi % G_ _ So
INPUTS TO 2911
Sl ,SO CONTROL LINES FOR ADORESS SOURCE SELECTION
i_'_.puP CONTROL LINES FOR PUSH/POP STACK
F.N_B..E LINE FOR INTERN.AL A[XSRESS REGISTER
ZE'--_ LOGIC _ INPUT ON THE OUTPUT LINES
OUTPUT ENABLE. _HEN _ is H_ON, THE Y
OUTPUTS ARE OFF (HIGH IMPEDANCE)
CARRY-IN TO THE INCREMENTER
DIRECT INPUTS TO THE MULTIPLEXER
CLOCK IkPUT TO THE AR AN0 uPC REGI STER AND
PUSH.POP STACK.
OUTPUTS FROM THE 2911
Yi Id_RESS OUTPUTS FROM 2911. (ADDRESS
INPUTS TO CONTROL H£NORY. )
Cn.4 CARRY OUT FROM _ INCRENENTER
EXTERNAL TO THE 2911
A _3ORESS TO THE CONTROL MEHORY
I(A) INSTRUCTION IN CONTROL NE),IORY AT ,II_GI_SS A
uR_R CONTENTS OF A Nl_ RIEGISTER (AT
OUTPUT OF CONTROL MEMORY). THE MICRO_ORO
REGISTER CONTAINS THE INSTRUCTION CURRENTLY
BE ING EXECUTED.
Tn TIME PERI00 (CYCLE) n
2911 Microprogram Sequencer
A-7
• m :
•m "#i
LOGI C O I AGRAM
LOG IC SYMBOL
r-- 13 Y3
' ---) I--- lo Y2
• __ I-_ 6 Y1
3 YO
: l--- 14 Q3
11 Q2
S Q1
I 2 %
LF-F
9 7
CP OE
"_TH TA_..I_
.._____ INPUTS
H
H
H
H
L
L
, L
OUTPUTS
CLOCK D q y
CP
L x NC Z
H X NC Z
L L Z
H H
L L
¢ H H
- L
- H
QI
Q2
Q3
YO
YI
Y2
Y3
STANDARD
OUTPUTS
THREE -STATE
OUTPUTS
PIN 8-GNO
PIN 16-Vcc
DESCRIPTION
THE 2918 CONSISTS OF FOUR D-TYPE FLIP-FLOPS I_ITH A BUFFERE0
COMMON CLOCK. INFORMATION MEETING THE SET-UP AND HOLD
REQUIRE]MENTS ON TIlE O INPUTS IS TRANSFERRED TO THE Q OUTPUTS
ON THE LOB-TO-HIGH TRANSITION OF THE CLOCK.
THE SANE DATA AS ON THE Q OUTPUTS IS ENABLED AT THE THREE-
STATE Y _UTPUTS _ THE "OUTPUT CONTROL" (QE) INPUT IS LOt_.
_HEN THE QE INPUT IS HIGH, THE Y OUTPUTS ARE IN THE HIGH-
IIV@EDANCE STATE.
THE 2918 IS A A-BIT, HIGH-SPEED REGISTER INTENOED FOR USE IN
REAL-TIME SIGNAL PROCESSING SYSTEMS t_-IERETHE STANOARO OUT-
PUTS ARE USED IN A RECURSIVE ALGORITHM AND THE THREE-STATE
OUTPUTS PROVIDE ACCESS TO A DATA BUS TO DUMP THE RESULTS AFTER
A NUMBER OF ITERATIONS.
THE 0EVICE CAN ALSO BE USEO AS AN ADDRESS REGISTER OR STATUS
REGISTER IN COMPUTERS OR COMPUTER PERIPHERALS.
THE 2918 IS ALSO USEFUL IN CERTAIN DISPLAY APPLICATIONS
_I-IERE THE STA_E)ARD OUTPUTS CAN BE DECODED TO DRIVE LEO'S
(OR EQUIVAt.BWT) AND THE THREE-STATE OUTPUTS ARE BUS ORGANIZED
FOR OCCASIONAL INTERROGATION OF THE DATA AS OISPLAYED.
DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONAL TERMS
0 i THE FOUR DATA INPUTS TO THE REGISTER.
Qi THE FOUR DATA OUTPUTS OF THE REGISTER _ITH STANOARD
TOTEH.POLE ACTIVE PULL-UP OUTPUTS. OATA IS PASSED NON-
INVERTED.
Yi THE FOUR THREE-STATE OATA OUIPUTS OF THE REGISTER. )_I-iEN
THE THREE-STATE OUTPUTS ARE ENABt.ED, DATA IS PASSED NON-
INVERTED. A HIGH ON THE "OUTPUT CONTROL" INPUT F(_RCES
THE Yi OUTPUTS TO _ HIGH. IMPEDANCE STATE.
CP CLOCK. THE BUFFERED COMMON CLOCK FOR THE REGISTER ENTERS
DATA ON THE LOR-TO-HIGH TRANSITION.
OUTPUT CONTROL. _-IEN THE QE INPUT IS HIGH, THE Y=
OUTPUTS ARE IN THE HIGH-IMPEDANCE STATE. t_EN THE LIE
INPUT IS LOW, THE TRUE REGISTER DATA IS PRESENT AT THE
Yt OUTPUTS.
NOTES L = LOW NC = NO CHANGE
H • HIGH $ • LOW TD HIGH TRANSITION
X • DON'T CARE Z • HIGH IMPEDANCE
NOTE:
Z
L
H
L 1
H 1
1. m-IEN _ IS LOW. THE Y 0UTI=LIT RILL BE IN THE SAME LOGIC
STATE AS THE Q OUTP!JT.
2918 Quad-D Register
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J Suff*x -- Case 632-07 ICeram,cl
N Suffix -- Case 646-05 tPlastlc!
SN54LS ;2
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QUAD 2-INPUT NOR GATE
LOW POWER SCHOTTKY
GUARANTEED OPERATING RANGES
SYMBOL L PARAMETE_
VCC ISuploly Voltage 54
I ?-,'
TA IOoeratmg Amolent Temperature Range 54
74
[
MIN
45
475
-55
0
TYp
50
5O
25
25
MAX Uf,_r"
5 5 _ v
525
125 i =C
7C
IOH IOutpUl Current -- High 54 74 --0 _ Ii m_
IOL q Outpul Current -- Low 5-' 4 0 i m;
T-: 80
DC CHARACllERIS'RCS OVER OPERATING TEMPERA'lURE RANGE (umess otherwise soeciheol
LqV,TE iSYMBOL i PARAMETER I'YP ' MAX UNITS TEST CONDITIOi"SMIN ,
V I Guaranteed Input HIGH Votta0e for
VIH i Input HIGH Vottage 2 0 ! [ All Inpu[s
: 5" 0 " ; Guaranteed Inpu! LOW Voltage tnr
VIL ; Input LOW Voltage 74 _ _ V I All Inputs
VW _lnput Clamp O,oae Voilaee -'C E- 5 " ! VCC = MIN lit; = - 18 m L
54 2_. - 5
YON I OutDqt HIGH Voltage
74 2 - 3 :
54 ;- SZL
_'OL IOuluut LOVd Voltaq_. TZ ? _ r _"f V
! VCC = MIN tOH = MAX. VIN = V[_
, or Vl L per Truth Table
I_, = 4 0 m_ : VCC = Vcc MIh
VIN = VIL or Vt-
I IOL = 80 mA I per Truth Tao_,,
-- _.'" _CC = MAX. Vtl_, = 2 7 r
ItH l Input HiGH Current: 2 " mA : VCC = MAX. MIN = 7 0 1',r
I:L I Input LOW Currer'" Z -: m_ , VCC = MAX V_ N = 0 ,:, _'
tO s rShort Circuit Curt.v, _': -IC'" m_ V_C = MAX
: Power Supply Lurrer;
tCC i lotal. Outout HIG '_ - m,-, '-'C- = M_-:"
: Total Oul_ut LO'. ¸'.
AC CHARACTERISTICS: TA = 25-C
LIIV!": UNIT_ TEST CONDITION_
SYMBOL I PARAMETE_ M!*'_ "": F_ :-;',
mLH
IPHL
Turn OIl Delay. InDut tO OUII)UI
'Turn 0n Delay Input tO Ou::_ :'.
Yes=50':
C t = 15 ;-,F
54LS02 Quad Nor
A-10
(_ Mo'r'ORO/. _
VCC
 '2JU_JLd
Gt_
J Sutflx -- Case 632-07 ICeram,c_
N Sudhx -- Case 646-0,5 LP_asg_cr
SN54LS84.
SN74LS04
HEX INVERTER
LOW POWER SCHOTTKY
GUARANI_ED OPERATING RANGES
SYMBOL PARAMETEF MIN I TY# MAX UNIT
VCC Supply Voltage 54 4 S 50 S 5 I V
74 4 75 5 O 5 25
T A Operating Arnbnent Temperature Range 54 --55 25 125 i "C
74 0 25 70 I
IOH Output Current -- H_on 54 74- -O z: m'=
IOL Output Current -- LOW 54 4 0 mA
74 E C
DC CHARAC11ERI_rlcs OVER OPERATING TEMPERATURE RANGE =unless omemvnse spec,hedl
LIMITS
SYMBOL i PARAMETER MIN TYP I MAX UNITS 11 TEST CONDITIONS
VLH " Input HIGH Vottac;e 20 V i Guaranteed Input HIGH VOltage to,
i All Inputs
5,:. C 7 Guaranteecl input LOW Voltage io:
V:L Inout LOW Voltaae 74 0 5 V i All Inputs
VlK mput ClamD Otoee Volta_. e -065 -t= ".' i VCC = MIN I!N =-18m_
54 2. 5 3 ": I VCC = MIN. lOW = MAX Vpt = Vl_
_0_4 Output HIGH VoLtacv 74 :" = 3 [: I or VIL per Truth Tap1,:
54 74 0 :_-" :; : '.' I _OL = 4 0 mA , vCC = vCC M;h
, V_'j = V! L Cjr V_
VC_ Outoul LOV_'Voltatte T" CEL L= _" I _OL =60hA i per Trut_Tas<
:7 i,.k ! VCC = MAX. Vt'! = 7. 9 ",'
qt_. input HIGH Curre'-t : m_, i VCC = MAX V= N = ? C '.
InPUt LOW Curr_t " - "_ I VCC = M*_X viN = o =
_cs Snort C_rcult Curre-: -:_'. --IC{r m_ VCC = MAX
I Power SUDplV Currerl
Total Output HtC'r"
Total. Output LO?.
ICC _ : mA ' VCC = MAY
AC CHARACTIERIS13C$: TA = 25 :C
LIMITS
SYMBOL PARAMETER ! MAX UNITS TEST CONDITIONS
IPLH
tpNL
Turn Off Delay. Inoul tO OUIDUt
'Turn On Delay. Input 1o OUIDUl
MIP_ TvP
9O 15 ns
I'_ 15 ns
VCc=SOV
CL = 15 O F
5404 Hex Inverter
A-I!
APPENDIX B
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